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Abstract 
The purpose of this research paper is to identify the main variables that impact an 
aerospace defense firm’s decision to lobby. This study focuses on important accounting and 
financial measures specific to each company. It also takes into account government and public 
variables such as the level of public scrutiny the company experiences and national defense 
spending. This study finds that cash flow and profitability are both negatively correlated with the 
decision to lobby. It also finds a positive correlation between inventory turnover and the decision 
to lobby the following year. Additionally, there is a positive relationship between public scrutiny 
and the decision to lobby. 
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Lobbying in the Defense Aerospace Industry 
Introduction 
The relationship between firms and the governments that regulate them has always been 
crucial to the success of society. Although companies need freedom to innovate and prosper, 
regulatory agencies must monitor them. Such monitoring aims to create a competitive 
environment, but it can also negatively affect an industry’s operations and profits. In order to 
protest harmful legislation and champion positive legislation, companies fund lobbyists to 
express the company’s views on proposed legislation. Lobbying is one of the many important 
parts of the relationship between firms and the government. Without lobbying, communication 
between companies and the government would be limited to press conferences and company 
publications. Lobbying allows a direct, constant, and updated relationship between firms and 
legislators. 
Billions of dollars are spent on lobbying each year (See appendix Figure 1 for lobbying 
by industry). In 2011 a total of 3.33 billion dollars were spent so that lobbyists could represent 
their employer’s interests regarding the passage of legislation including contracts, regulatory 
laws, and even budget cuts. The lobbyists are charged with making sure the representatives in 
charge of the relevant legislation understand the value and needs of the companies affected by 
that legislation. Lobbyists encourage representatives to support or oppose a piece of legislation 
depending on how it would affect their employer. 
Despite the benefits of lobbying there are some who view it in a negative light. Some 
lobbyists have been thought to influence legislators unfairly. This view is supported by research 
such as that of Bertrand (2012), who found that political connections are more important than 
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subject expertise when it comes to being an effective lobbyist. This seems to indicate that 
lobbyists are trying to manipulate legislators by befriending them and then calling in favors for 
the companies they represent. The dark side of lobbying is a reality, because some bribery has 
been uncovered in different industries throughout the years (Polly, 1994). 
On the other hand, several studies document the bright side of lobbying. Bertrand (2012), 
despite some of his findings indicating some unethical lobbying, also finds no evidence that a 
firm could buy consistent political influence by engaging in heavy lobbying. This contradicts 
Bertrand’s original findings and supports lobbying as a legitimate practice and refutes suspicions 
of the corporate world buying legislator’s votes in Washington. Coates (2012) finds that 
lobbying, while it does not pay off every time, generates significant return to shareholders. 
Despite its dark side, lobbying is still one of the best methods for companies to have a voice in 
Washington. The bright side to lobbying is that companies are not left out of the decision making 
process, whether their goals are accomplished or not; they at least get to voice their concerns. 
 The defense aerospace industry, and lobbying by its companies, has been around since 
planes were first used in World War I. However, several recent advances illustrate the increased 
role this industry is expected to play in the economy. The space frontier, which is part of the 
defense aerospace industry, has only recently become accessible to institutions other than 
governments. The first company to dock with the international space station only did so in 2012, 
and it has only existed since 2002 (SpaceX.com). Until then, only governments had docked with 
international space stations. For a company to accomplish this task, not only on its own, but of its 
own volition, indicates that the aerospace defense industry is finally at a point where the demand 
from the private sector adds to that from the public sector. These companies may soon rely less 
on defense contracts and more on consumer sales. This is not to say that military aerospace 
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defense will decrease. In fact, satellite and orbiting defense systems are being developed further. 
As this industry becomes more prevalent, both to the public for business and exploration and to 
the government for defense, it is increasingly important to understand its different facets. One of 
these facets is the lobbying relationship the aerospace defense industry has with the federal 
government.  
 This paper is the first to document the main factors explaining the decision of an 
aerospace defense company to engage in lobbying. The analysis shows that a unit increase in 
cash flow per share will significantly decrease the log odds that a company will engage in 
lobbying. At the same time, a unit increase in inventory turnover per year should boost the log 
odds of a defense aerospace company engaging in lobbying. Public scrutiny and size are also 
found to be positively related to lobbying to a significant degree. Finally, net profit margin and 
return on assets are both found to be negatively related to lobbying.  
 The remainder of this study reviews the recent literature on lobbying. Then the 
methodology, data, and variables are discussed, including justification for each variable and 
hypotheses. That is followed by the descriptive statistics and Logit regression results. The end of 
the paper holds the results section and a conclusion. 
Literature Review 
 Despite the significant amount of available research on factors that affect lobbying in 
industries such as banking, financing, healthcare, and energy, there is an apparent lack of 
research focused on aerospace defense companies. This paper serves to help fill the gap in that 
area of lobbying research. The existing lobbying literature provides insight that helps determine 
the main factors affecting the changes in lobbying done by aerospace defense companies.  
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 Chen’s, Parsley’s, and Yang’s (2012) work examines corporate lobbying activities in the 
finance and banking industry from a financial perspective. Chen et al (2012) find that accounting 
and market measures of financial performance are positively related to the amount of lobbying 
that companies engage in. These indicators include total assets, cash flow, net profit margin, and 
return on assets. Total assets measure a company’s size and, according to Chen et al, the bigger a 
company is the more likely it is to lobby. In addition, their results indicate that more profitable 
firms are more likely to spend on lobbying the following year. Chen’s et al (2012) empirical 
analysis also shows that the portfolio of companies with the highest lobbying intensity 
outperforms their benchmarks for the three years immediately following the portfolio formation.  
There are several differences between Chen’s approach and the analysis of the aerospace 
defense industry. The aerospace defense industry has a fundamentally different inventory 
turnover than other industries. It takes companies in this industry longer to complete the large 
projects they obtain contracts for. Once these firms secure contracts they are less likely to lobby 
again right away. They instead only lobby again when new contracts are needed. In this case, the 
impact of variables such as cash flow, net profit margin, and return on assets will be to decrease 
lobbying the following year. This means that an aerospace defense company with a lower level 
of profitability is more likely to lobby for contracts in order to improve margins. 
Alexander (2012) shows that lobbying is not only beneficial, but that it is also becoming 
more utilized by domestic companies. Alexander’s study shows that lobbying has experienced 
exponential growth over the last decade. In that study, the coalition of lobbyists who supported a 
specific tax holiday provision received $220 dollars in return for every dollar spent on lobbying. 
Though not every instance of lobbying is so beneficial, it is clear from Alexander’s study that 
lobbying can generate significant wealth for a company’s shareholders. Alexander suggests that 
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the exponential growth in lobbying will not slow down anytime soon. Her results add weight to 
the importance of understanding modern lobbying trends. According to Alexander, such trends 
are expected to shape the decisions made by lobbying firms, including those in the aerospace and 
defense industry.  
Alexander (2012) also discusses the significance of transparent legislation in lobbying 
activity by firms. She defines transparent legislation as legislation for which the implications of 
the bill are easy to foresee. For example, a contract for a new jet is considered to be transparent 
legislation because firms can accurately determine the value added by lobbying efforts for that 
contract. In turn, complex healthcare legislation, for which the implications may be more 
difficult to predict, is considered less transparent legislation. The tax holiday legislation 
Alexander studies is relatively transparent and the profit from the enactment of tax legislation is 
foreseeable to almost the exact amount. She suggests that as the transparency decreases for a 
piece of legislation, the level of return on lobbying may decrease as well. She argues that this is 
due to the increased difficulty in calculating the optimal level of lobbying to engage in since the 
results of the legislation, while clearly positive or negative, are not as clear in dollar value terms. 
Taking this into consideration, and knowing much of the aerospace lobbying targets transparent 
contract legislation coming from the military for defense purposes, it is important to control for 
yearly government spending.  
Coates’ (2012) research concludes that heavily-regulated industries, or industries that rely 
heavily on the government, both of which are true of the aerospace defense industry, tend to have 
higher corporate value and stronger shareholder power. This indicates that a shift in relevant 
government activity, such as total spending, military spending, or aerospace spending directly, 
may warrant an increase in lobbying by public aerospace defense companies. That may be due 
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either to the need to lobby to maintain a high corporate value and strong shareholder support, or 
due to the fact that such companies tend to lobby as a result of the high corporate value and the 
strong shareholder standing. Regardless, a significant relationship between military activity and 
lobbying by the companies in this paper’s sample may lead to important conclusions. 
Kong’s (2011) analysis of corporate lobbying indicates a significant correlation between 
lobbying intensity and public scrutiny. According to Kong, there is a high positive relationship 
between the amount of lobbying a company engages in and the amount of attention focused on it 
by the public and media. Kong says the timely public recognition of good news will lead to a 
downturn in lobbying and vice versa. Kong also says that this downturn that follows good 
publicity is only present in companies with high media exposure. This paper utilizes media 
exposure as a form of public scrutiny to test Kong’s argument that public scrutiny is an important 
factor in explaining why aerospace defense companies decide to lobby. The public scrutiny 
variable is taken on a domestic basis; the international aspects are not accounted for in this 
analysis. In theory, the amount of media exposure will positively correlate with the chances of 
lobbying by an aerospace defense firm.  
Several more studies that analyze lobbying prompt this study to include additional 
independent variables. Padovani and Gibson (2011) document the relationship between the credit 
of banks and the amount of lobbying they engage in. They find that as the credit of a bank 
decreases, the lobbying activity increases. Based on this finding, interest coverage is included as 
an independent variable to account for credit rating. In addition, a study by Blau, Brough, and 
Thomas, (2011) focuses on the relationship between lobbying and the amount of TARP bailouts 
received. Blau’s et al study enforces the principle that firms facing scarce resources must lobby 
harder for those resources. This principle transfers to the aerospace and defense industry 
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regarding government funding and contracts. In this study, military spending as a factor of 
government spending is included as an independent variable. 
Gao and Huang (2011) show that hedge funds which are connected to lobbyists engage in 
a higher percentage of trading in politically sensitive stock than do non-connected hedge funds. 
Gao and Huang also find that lobbying funds outperform by 1.6 to 2.5 percent per month on 
politically sensitive stocks than their non-political holdings. Gao and Huang also find that there 
may be some unethical information dissemination because of the clear trends found between 
successful firms in certain politically sensitive areas and lobbying firms. 
 The literature on lobbying provides the foundation for developing this study’s hypotheses 
and identifying the variables expected to significantly impact aerospace defense lobbying. These 
dependent variables include firm-specific accounting measures, macroeconomic levels, and 
social indicators. By utilizing variables from each of these categories this study identifies the 
main factors affecting an aerospace defense firm’s decision to lobby. 
Methodology, Data, and Variables 
Logit Regression Model:  
 This study aims to determine how the firm-specific, macroeconomic, and social factors 
impact a firm’s decision to lobby. The dependent variable is lobbying, measured as whether a 
firm decides to engage in lobbying (1) or not (0).  
This study runs several Logit regressions, to identify which variables are better suited to 
accurately determining the chances of the aerospace and defense firms engaging in lobbying or 
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not. The models are represented in this singular equation given with the interchanged variables in 
their respective places. 
Lobbyt = ln(π/1-π)t = β0 + β1Sizet-1 + β2CFt-1 + β3InvTurnt-1 + β4MilSpendt-1 + β5PubScrutt-1 + 
β6(GDP, Unemployment, Inflation)t-1 + β7(NPM, ROA)t-1 + β8(Debt, IntCov)t-1 + e 
The dependent variable takes on either 1 or 0 as its value in the model with probabilities 
of π and π -1 respectively. (π/1-π) in this model is referred to as the odds ratio. Unit changes in 
each independent variable cause shifts in the log of odds ratio, which represents the possibility of 
an aerospace and defense firm engaging in lobbying. When the Logit regressions are analyzed a 
one unit change in any positively correlated significant independent variable causes an increase 
in the log odds of lobbying by the independent variables coefficient. A one unit change in any 
negatively correlated significant variable will cause a decrease in the log odds of lobbying by the 
independent variables coefficient. 
Data: 
 The companies analyzed in this study contain not only the largest aerospace and defense 
firms in the country but some of the smaller ones as well (see appendix for list of companies 
included in study). Boeing, Lockheed Martin, and United Technologies are by far the largest 
lobbying contributors, as far as this industry goes (see figure appendix Figure 3). This industry 
affects the whole country, not only by contributing to national defense, but by contributing 
billions to the economy too; which makes its analysis is important.  
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The data in this analysis comes from several sources. The lobbying activity for each firm, 
used for the dependent variable, appears in opensecrets.org1. The data for the dependent variable 
is used on a yearly basis for the span of 2005-2011. The dependent variable has a value of 1, 
meaning lobbying occurred, 94 times in the study; it has a value of 0, meaning the firm did not 
lobby that year, a total of 32 times.  
The book value of total assets used to determine the size of each company appears in the 
Damodaran Online database. The data for variables cash flow per share, inventory turnover, net 
profit margin, return on assets, total debt/total assets, and interest coverage after taxes, was 
gathered from the annual ratio reports provided by the Standard and Poor’s Net Advantage. 
Public scrutiny data comes from the Wall Street Journal archives provided through the ProQuest 
database. The data for public variables military spending/total government spending, GDP 
growth rated, unemployment rate, and inflation variables was gathered from the World Data 
Bank database. The data for the independent variables are included on a yearly basis for the span 
of 2004-2010. 
It is important to note the expected effect of the political party in power during this study. 
This analysis only consists of seven years of data for each of the variables so analyzing the 
trends of political party is difficult since only one political party was in power for the majority of 
the study. In recent years, since the Democrats took power in Congress, lobbying by defense 
aerospace companies has decreased. This is because the Democratic Congress is less likely to 
pass defense bills. That important factor is unfortunately not included in the study due to time 
constraints on the data. All that can be done is to acknowledge the limitations of the study and 
interpret the variables available while keeping this principle in mind. 
                                                          
1
 http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/indusclient.php?id=D01&year=2010 
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Table 1: Variables and Expected Signs 
Variable Formula/Description Expected Sign 
Size Book value of total assets + 
Cash Flow (Net income + depreciation + depletion + amortization )/ # of 
shares - 
Inventory Turnover How many time a firm sells their entire inventory per year. + 
NPM After Tax Net profit margin after taxes / Total sales -/+ 
Return On Assets Net income / Total Assets -/+ 
Debt Total debt / Total Assets + 
Interest Coverage Earnings after tax / Interest expense - 
Military Spending Military Spending/Government Spending - 
Public Scrutiny # of WSJ articles published about each company per year + 
GDP Growth Rate GDP growth rate per year - 
Unemployment Rate Unemployed / Labor force + 
Inflation Calculated as change in the Consumer Price Index + 
 
Size is the book value of total assets for each firm. Chen et al (2012) and Brandon (2011) 
document the importance of accounting for the size of a firm when analyzing lobbying activity. 
This variable is somewhat more important when analyzing the actual amount of lobbying that 
each firm does. However, size remains a crucial variable since it may still influence how often a 
firm lobbies, or whether they decide to lobby at all. This study hypothesizes that size is 
positively correlated with lobbying. 
Cash Flow per Share is the sum of net income, plus depreciation, depletion and 
amortization per share. According to Chen et al (2012) this variable is an indicator of how 
financially strong a company is. The literature supports using financial and accounting measures 
when analyzing lobbying and cash flow per share is the most widely used measure. The evidence 
provided by previous studies indicates that a high level of cash flow per share is associated with 
more lobbying expenses the following year. However, this study also hypothesizes that cash flow 
per share is negatively correlated with lobbying. The difference in the hypothesis associated with 
cash flow per share is explained by fundamental differences between the aerospace and defense 
13 
 
 
 
industry and other industries. An aerospace defense company that experiences high cash flow 
will not lobby as much, if at all, the following year because firms generate the desired level of 
cash flow after they receive funding or contracts. This means that the firm will not need to lobby 
for an extended period of time, while it completes the current contracts. Thus, an increase in cash 
flow will decrease the log odds of a company lobbying the following year.  
Inventory Turnover is another indicator of each firm’s financial activity. It differs from 
cash flow per share in that it shows whether a company runs mostly off of selling a few big ticket 
items each year, or off of going through a lot of smaller products each year. Firms with a high 
turnover may need to lobby more than those with lower inventory turnover, as a continuous 
pipeline of contracts is more important to firms with a high turnover. This study hypothesizes  
that a higher inventory turnover will positively impact a firm’s decision to lobby. 
Net Profit Margin and Return on Assets are both utilized as profitability indicators for 
the firms herein. NPM is after tax profits as a percentage of total assets. ROA is net income to 
total assets. These two independent variables will help to determine the relationship between a 
firm’s most recent yearly profitability and the decision to engage in lobbying. Chen et al (2012) 
and Brandon (2011) both find that future profitability is positively correlated with lobbying.  
However, it is also possible that underperforming firms might engage in lobbying to boost their 
future performance. 
Debt and Interest Coverage both deal with a company’s ability to cover its debts. Debt 
is measured as total debt to total assets and interest coverage is earnings after tax to interest 
expense. In the literature, Brandon (2011) finds that the credit rating of a firm greatly impacts the 
amount of lobbying engaged in by the firm. This study measures a company’s creditworthiness 
14 
 
 
 
with the debt and interest coverage. It is hypothesized that debt will be positively correlated with 
a company’s lobbying activity. It is also hypothesized that interest coverage will be negatively 
correlated with a company’s lobbying. 
Military Spending as a percentage of total Government Spending is crucial in this 
study because of how closely the aerospace and defense industry is tied to the military activity of 
the country. As technology advances, the aerospace industry becomes an important provider of 
equipment and expertise in national defense. Drones, planes, satellites, and orbiting defense 
systems are all products of this industry and become more heavily demanded as defense 
spending increases, presumably during a conflict or as precautionary steps. Regardless of the 
cause, higher military spending positively impacts the aerospace and defense industry. It is 
hypothesized that as military spending increases, lobbying activity will decrease. Similarly 
Blau’s study finds that lobbying activity by financial firms increased during the great recession, 
when government TARP bailouts were much needed by banks. Similarly if a the aerospace and 
defense industry find themselves in need of scarce government funds then lobbying will, in 
theory, increase. Thus, during times of increased military spending the firms do not have to fight 
for contracts or funding as much as when military spending is down. 
Public Scrutiny is used to test the hypothesis that companies subject to higher levels of 
public scrutiny play a significant role in lobbying. Kong (2011) finds that public scrutiny is a 
significant factor in explaining lobbying by companies in the financial industry. In this analysis 
the public scrutiny variable is based on the Wall Street Journal’s coverage of each company. As 
a premier leader in the business news industry, the Wall Street Journal will serve as the proxy for 
all media coverage. This variable simply represents how many articles the Wall Street Journal 
published about each company per year. In aerospace and defense the public scrutiny plays a less 
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critical role on each firm’s actions as they are on the banking industry. However, the public, 
especially shareholders, still play an important role in the shaping major decisions made by 
firms. And while the critical judgment associated with banks does not transfer to aerospace and 
defense firms, positive media coverage still boosts stock prices. Based on Kong’s findings, the 
public scrutiny variable is hypothesized to positively impact lobbying. This is in part due to the 
assumption that companies with a large media following are larger companies that want to 
present confidence by embracing the greater public exposure that comes from lobbying. That is 
due to the legal requirements for extensive disclosure that accompany lobbying of any kind. 
Alternatively a small company will not embrace the unnecessary disclosure.  
GDP, Unemployment, and Inflation are used in this study to account for the economic 
state of the country and how that affects the aerospace and defense industry. Blau (2011) 
discusses how lobbying allowed financial firms to receive more bail out money during the great 
recession. Aerospace and defense companies have never and likely will never receive bailouts, 
but these companies do receive contracts and funding. This study will use GDP, unemployment, 
and inflation to see how economic downturns impacted aerospace and defense lobbying. It is 
hypothesized that increases in GDP growth rate will be negatively correlated with lobbying and 
the increases in unemployment and inflation will be positive correlated with lobbying. This is 
based on the more generic hypothesis, supported by Chen et al (2012), that economic booms will 
allow firms to be more successful without having to lobby.  
Results 
Descriptive Statistics: The mean and standard deviation for Lobby (1) and Lobby (0) are lagged 
one year. These statistics reflect data for (t-1) when lobbying occurs at time (t). Table 2 presents 
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the descriptive statistics for the variables used in this study. The mean and standard deviation are 
presented for each independent variable in two groups. The first group, Lobby (1), represents the 
instances where companies engaged in lobbying. The second group, Lobby (0), represents 
instances where companies decided not to lobby in a given year. The T-Test identifies four 
variables that are significantly different between the Lobby 1 and Lobby 0 group.  
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
 Lobby (1)  Lobby (0)    
 Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev T -Test 
Mann-
Whitney 
Size 9.617642 0.907934 9.647617 0.776068 .198 Retain 
CF 3.628379 3.006003 5.277052 3.297941 .344 Reject** 
InvTurn 6.254488 4.499511 5.478588 3.737821 .607 Retain 
PubScrut 95.8617 156.9891 51.4375 58.49397 .005 Retain 
NPM 0.018674 0.141989 0.069362 0.045323 .077 Reject** 
ROA 0.034557 0.076829 0.065204 0.04484 .235 Reject** 
Debt 24.64355 13.77766 16.01461 8.314479 .001 Reject*** 
IntCov 6.201686 7.3227 10.69226 17.32992 .002 Reject*** 
MilSpend 18.5571 0.37054 18.48793 0.401937 - - 
GDP 1.509106 2.349081 1.336497 2.457401 - - 
Unplmnt 6.268085 1.965904 6.61875 2.134424 - - 
Inflation 2.502275 1.308272 2.365174 1.382394 - - 
Size is the size of the firm, measured by log of total assets; CF is cash flow per share measured as net income plus depreciation, depletion and 
amortization, divided by shares; InvTurn is inventory turnover measured by how many times a company’s inventory is sold and replaced each 
year; MilSpend is military spending as a percentage of total government spending; PubScrut is public scrutiny measured by number of WSJ 
articles published on each company per year; IntCov is interest coverage after tax calculated by earnings after tax to interest expense; GDP is the 
national gross domestic product growth rate per year; Unplmnt is the national unemployment rate; Inflation is inflation measured by changes in 
the consumer price index; NPM is net profit margin measured as after tax profits as a percentage of total sales; ROA is return on assets calculated 
as net income to total assets; ROE is return on equity calculated as net income to average common equity (average common equity is the average 
of common equity at year beginning and year end); ROI is return on investments calculated as gain from investing minus cost of investing to cost 
of investing. 
The PubScrut, NPM, Debt, and IntCov variables are each statistically different enough between 
the two lobby groups that these variables are especially suited to impact the lobbying activities of 
aerospace and defense companies. Next to the T-Test, the Mann-Whitney test is used to 
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document which independent variables are distributed differently in lobby 1 compared to lobby 
0. This means that the size variable is distributed the same across the lobby 1 group and the 
lobby 0 group. According to the Mann-Whitney test InvTurn and PubScrut are also distributed 
like size, however the significance level of these results is not high enough to utilize these 
results. The results for CF, NPM, ROA, Debt, and IntCov are all distributed differently from 
Lobby 1 to Lobby 0. See Figure 4 in the appendix for the correlation matrix of variables. 
 
Logit Regression Results: 
The results from the GDP Logit regressions are shown in Table 4 (see appendix figures 5 
and 6 for unemployment and inflation models). Table 4 shows that there are only three 
independent variables that consistently and significantly impact the lobbying activity of the 
companies in the study. These variables are CF, InvTurn, and PubScrut.  Each is significant at 
the .01 level, indicating a very high level of certainty that these log odds coefficients are 
accurate.  
Among these three variables, the cash flow per share has the most impact on the chances 
that a company will engage in lobbying. Based on the CF coefficient, it can be seen that a one 
unit change in cash flow per share will lead to a decrease of anywhere from .611 to .706 in the 
log odds of a firm engaging in lobbying. Looking at inventory turnover the results show a one 
unit increase will cause an increase in the log odds of a company lobbying by .336 to .387. The 
results for public scrutiny indicate that every additional article will increase the log odds of a 
firm lobbying by .009. The coefficient for public scrutiny is much smaller than the coefficients 
of the other variables. This means that the public scrutiny variable could increase by many more 
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unites from year to year where as CF and inventory turnover change in smaller, more impactful, 
increments. The results for these three variables support the hypotheses made for each variable.  
 
Table 4: Logit Regression Results with GDP as Economic Indicator 
 R 1 R 2 R 3 R 4 
Constant 15.618 
(.262) 
14.195 
(.306) 
15.764 
(.274) 
12.670 
(.362) 
MilSpend -.953 
(.198) 
-.821 
(.256) 
-1.094 
(.157) 
-.873 
(.238) 
PubScrut .009*** 
(.008) 
.009*** 
(.006) 
.009*** 
(.009) 
.009*** 
(.007) 
GDP -.064 
(.582) 
-.068 
(.555) 
-.069 
(.555) 
-.081 
(.479) 
Size .348 
(.429) 
.211 
(.625) 
.713* 
(.097) 
.588 
(.157) 
CF -.636*** 
(.000) 
-.611*** 
(.000) 
-.706*** 
(.000) 
-.676*** 
(.000) 
InvTurn .339*** 
(.002) 
.336*** 
(.002) 
.375*** 
(.001) 
.387*** 
(.001) 
NPM -10.557 
(.146)  
-18.639* 
(.055)  
ROA 
 
-8.197 
(.262)  
-20.753* 
(.099) 
Debt .034 
(.149) 
.037 
(.128)   
IntCov 
  
.024 
(.444) 
.032 
(.380) 
Size is the size of the firm, measured by log of total assets; CF is cash flow per share measured as net income plus depreciation, depletion and 
amortization, divided by shares; InvTurn is inventory turnover measured by how many times a company’s inventory is sold and replaced each 
year; MilSpend is military spending as a percentage of total government spending; PubScrut is public scrutiny measured by number of WSJ 
articles published on each company per year; IntCov is interest coverage after tax calculated by earnings after tax to interest expense; GDP is 
the national gross domestic product growth rate per year; Unplmnt is the national unemployment rate; Inflation is inflation measured by 
changes in the consumer price index; NPM is net profit margin measured as after tax profits as a percentage of total sales; ROA is return on 
assets calculated as net income to total assets. 
*Statistically Significant at 10% Level 
**Statistically Significant at 5% Level 
***Statistically Significant at 1% Level 
 
The results are especially interesting because CF and InvTurn are indicators of financial strength 
and activity. The different impact of these variables on lobbying is explained by the differences 
between the aerospace industry and other industries. All else being equal, the cash flow increases 
after the aerospace defense company receives a contract and the need to lobby decreases 
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significantly because the firm now works on a multi-year contract. Once the firm finishes the 
project, it turns over its inventory, and intensifies its lobbying activity for additional contracts.  
 Although the coefficients of the size variable are all positive, only Model R3 indicates 
that size plays a significant role on a company’s decision to lobby.  Net profit margin (NPM) is 
also significant in R 3, which shows that an increase in NPM causes a reduction of 18.639 in the 
log odds that lobbying will take place. In R 4 the ROA variable is significant with a -20.753 
coefficient. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that firms with higher profitability 
are less likely to lobby than their less profitable competitors.   
 This study checks the robustness of the results by using two alternative proxies for 
economic activity in addition to GDP which are unemployment and inflation. The results 
obtained when using unemployment and inflation are consistent with the evidence provided by 
the GDP Logit regression which indicates that the results found are indeed robust.  
Conclusion 
This study finds that cash flow, inventory turnover, and public scrutiny significantly 
impact a firm’s decision to lobby the following year. We document a negative impact on 
lobbying when cash flow increases and a positive impact on lobbying when inventory turnover 
increases. Thus, one of the implications of this study is that companies will need to monitor their 
inventory turnover carefully. This analysis also shows that there is a positive impact on lobbying 
when public scrutiny increases. In addition to these three variables, the analysis shows that size 
positively impacts the log odds of a firm lobbying, while NPM and ROA have a negative impact.  
This study helps advance the understanding of the aerospace defense industry’s 
operations and of their relationship with the government. Additional research is needed to 
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understand how these firms will help shape regulation as space travel becomes more prevalent 
for the government and the public. Additional areas for future research include utilizing 
international aspects of this industry to help explain lobbying in this sector and using a Tobit 
model to investigate the impact of these factors on the amount companies spend on lobbying. 
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Figure 1: Lobbying Industry Overview 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Defense Aerospace Lobbying 
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Note: Other companies in study lobbied zero dollars in 2011 and are excluded from Figure 2 
 
Figure 3: Lobbying by Aerospace Defense Firm (2011) 
 
Figure 4: Correlation Matrix of Variables 
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Figure 5: Logit Regression Results with Unemployment as Economic Indicator 
26 
 
 
 
 R 5 R 6 R 7 R 8 
Constant 36.843 
(.309) 
28.769 
(.413) 
47.900 
(.191) 
37.969 
(.289) 
MilSpend -2.061 
(.270) 
-1.585 
(.380) 
-2.769 
(.145) 
-2.191 
(.236) 
PubScrut .008** 
(.011) 
.009*** 
(.008) 
.008** 
(.014) 
.009*** 
(.010) 
Unplmnt -.196 
(.562) 
-.129 
(.696) 
-.300 
(.374) 
-.232 
(.490) 
Size .411 
(.356) 
.248 
(.570) 
.811* 
(.068) 
.649 
(.125) 
CF -.637*** 
(.000) 
-.603*** 
(.000) 
-.719*** 
(.000) 
-.676*** 
(.000) 
InvTurn .339*** 
(.002) 
.334*** 
(.002) 
.378*** 
(.001) 
.388*** 
(.001) 
NPM -12.023 
(.121) 
 -21.672** 
(.039) 
 
ROA  -8.908 
(.239) 
 -22.411* 
(.085) 
Debt .033 
(.161) 
.036 
(.133) 
  
IntCov   .028 
(.387) 
.034 
(.360) 
Size is the size of the firm, measured by log of total assets; CF is cash flow per share measured as net income plus depreciation, depletion and 
amortization, divided by shares; InvTurn is inventory turnover measured by how many times a company’s inventory is sold and replaced each 
year; MilSpend is military spending as a percentage of total government spending; PubScrut is public scrutiny measured by number of WSJ 
articles published on each company per year; IntCov is interest coverage after tax calculated by earnings after tax to interest expense; Unplmnt 
is the national unemployment rate; NPM is net profit margin measured as after tax profits as a percentage of total sales; ROA is return on 
assets calculated as net income to total assets. 
*Statistically Significant at 10% Level 
**Statistically Significant at 5% Level 
***Statistically Significant at 1% Level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Logit Regression Results with Inflation as Economic Indicator 
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 R 9 R 10 R 11 R 12 
Constant 23.808 
(.282) 
20.279 
(.351) 
28.618 
(.224) 
21.393 
(.330) 
MilSpend -1.429 
(.245) 
-1.173 
(.324) 
-1.839 
(.164) 
-1.377 
(.259) 
PubScrut .009*** 
(.009) 
.009*** 
(.007) 
.009*** 
(.010) 
.009*** 
(.008) 
Inflation .121 
(.710) 
.080 
(.804) 
.195 
(.564) 
.118 
(.714) 
Size .378 
(.392) 
.226 
(.602) 
.761* 
(.079) 
.611 
(.143) 
CF -.629*** 
(.000) 
-.599*** 
(.000) 
-.707*** 
(.000) 
-.666*** 
(.000) 
InvTurn .336*** 
(.002) 
.333*** 
(.002) 
.377*** 
(.001) 
.384*** 
(.001) 
NPM -11.257 
(.133) 
 -20.465** 
(.045) 
 
ROA  -8.485 
(.250) 
 -21.137* 
(.095) 
Debt .034 
(.152) 
.037 
(.127) 
  
IntCov   .027 
(.398) 
.032 
(.384) 
Size is the size of the firm, measured by log of total assets; CF is cash flow per share measured as net income plus depreciation, depletion and 
amortization, divided by shares; InvTurn is inventory turnover measured by how many times a company’s inventory is sold and replaced each 
year; MilSpend is military spending as a percentage of total government spending; PubScrut is public scrutiny measured by number of WSJ 
articles published on each company per year; IntCov is interest coverage after tax calculated by earnings after tax to interest expense; Inflation 
is inflation measured by changes in the consumer price index; NPM is net profit margin measured as after tax profits as a percentage of total 
sales; ROA is return on assets calculated as net income to total assets. 
*Statistically Significant at 10% Level 
**Statistically Significant at 5% Level 
***Statistically Significant at 1% Level 
 
